Event Introduction: The Watershed Significance of Zimbabwe’s Ban
On February 25, 2026, Zimbabwe, Africa’s fourth-largest lithium producer, dropped a bombshell. The Ministry of Mines announced an immediate suspension of all exports of lithium ore and lithium concentrates, covering minerals currently in transit with no clear timeline for resumption. The ministry stated in the announcement that the move aimed to “promote domestic beneficiation of mineral resources to increase added value” and “ensure compliance and accountability in exports”, serving the national interest.
This policy is not a hasty decision but an inevitable upgrade of the country’s resource strategy. Back in December 2022, Zimbabwe first banned lithium ore exports, launching a “value retention” strategy to force mining companies to refine minerals locally and capture greater economic benefits from its national resources.
In June 2025, the then Minister of Mines further clarified plans to fully ban lithium concentrate exports starting January 2027, only allowing exports of processed products such as lithium sulfate. However, after the mining minister was replaced by Politic Kambamura in late 2025, the new government adopted a more aggressive implementation strategy—bringing the ban forward to February 2026 with far stronger enforcement than expected. The new rule clarifies that only mining companies with valid mining licenses and approved beneficiation plants will be entitled to export minerals, and third-party agency trade is completely prohibited.
This has dealt a direct blow to Chinese lithium salt plants highly dependent on imports. Customs data shows that in 2025, China imported about 1.204 million tons of lithium concentrate from Zimbabwe, equivalent to about 150,000 tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE), accounting for 15.5% to 19% of China’s total lithium ore imports. Zimbabwe has become China’s second-largest source of hard rock lithium imports after Australia. The ban has reduced the global monthly supply of lithium concentrate by about 12,000–14,000 tons LCE, exacerbating short-term supply shortages. Following the news, lithium carbonate futures surged—Wind data on February 26 showed that domestic lithium carbonate (99.5%) was quoted at 173,100 yuan per ton, up 6.93% from the previous day. U.S. lithium mining stocks also rallied sharply, with Sigma Lithium jumping 27% and Albemarle rising 9.91%.
Nevertheless, Chinese-funded enterprises in Zimbabwe have seen sharply divergent situations. Yahua Group was minimally affected as it meets the “mining right + beneficiation plant” qualification and has started construction of a local lithium sulfate project. The company stated that it had cleared local mine inventories in advance, and all previously produced lithium concentrate had been shipped back by sea, ensuring domestic production demand without disrupting mine operations; it has resubmitted export applications and expects approval to resume exports in 1–2 weeks at the earliest.
Zhongkang Resources also noted that it is negotiating with the local government, with sufficient domestic inventories to cushion short-term impacts, and its local lithium salt plant is under construction, scheduled to be commissioned in mid-2027. Shengxin Lithium Energy responded that it has initiated communication with the local government but the specific impact remains unclear. Tianhua New Energy is not directly affected for the time being as its lithium project has not yet been put into production, with follow-up impacts dependent on policies at the time of commissioning.
Downstream energy storage manufacturers have also felt the chill. On February 26, 10 A-share or Hong Kong-listed companies among the 16 major global energy storage manufacturers listed by Soochow Securities saw their stock prices fall across the board: CATL dropped 4.47%, BYD 1.75%, EVE Energy 5.04%, CALB 9.26%, and Pengxin Energy 9.15%. EVE Energy commented that the incident may trigger industry cost fluctuations, with short-term impacts dependent on enterprises’ supply chain management capabilities; the company has achieved full industrial chain coverage of key lithium battery materials through joint ventures, enhancing supply chain stability. Pengxin Energy stated that raw material price fluctuations would impact the entire energy storage industry.
Zheng Xiaoqiang, a lithium industry analyst at Mysteel New Energy Division, pointed out that if the export ban lasts more than three months, production at some lithium salt plants with insufficient inventories will slow rapidly, leading to supply reductions and sustained price hikes. COFCO Futures also judged that domestic lithium ore and lithium salt inventories can ensure a smooth transition if the ban lasts less than a month; supply tightness will intensify if it exceeds one month.
Major Power Game: The Divergence in China-US Policy Logic
Facing the “stranglehold” from resource-rich countries, China is making simultaneous efforts on the supply and technology fronts, rolling out a package of strategies to “reduce dependence in the short term and seek breakthroughs in the long run”.
On the policy front, on January 8, 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration jointly issued an announcement: from April 1 to December 31, 2026, the VAT export rebate rate for lithium ion battery products will be reduced from 9% to 6%; starting January 1, 2027, the VAT export rebate for battery products will be fully canceled. The Ministry of Finance clarified that the move aims to guide the industry to shift from “low-price competition” to “high-quality development” and comprehensively rectify “involutionary” competition. This policy adjustment coincides with the implementation of Zimbabwe’s ban, creating dual pressure: tightening overseas resource supply on one hand, and phasing out export subsidies on the other, forcing enterprises to choose between cost control and technological premium.
Wedbush Securities analyzed that China’s cancellation of export rebates is a strategic move, marking a shift from “capturing the global market with low-cost batteries” to “prioritizing industry health and high-value-added exports”, and reflecting Beijing’s confidence in its battery dominance to withstand higher export prices. The policy adjustment essentially exports China’s inflation to the global electric vehicle market, forcing Western automakers to accelerate the construction of their own supply chains.
On the technology front, on February 7, 2026, the Annual Conference of China All-Solid-State Battery Industry-University-Research Collaborative Innovation Platform was held in Beijing, bringing together government, industry, university and research sectors to focus on R&D progress and key common technical breakthroughs for all-solid-state batteries. Ouyang Minggao, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, pointed out in his keynote report that all-solid-state batteries are a major strategic direction for the next-generation battery upgrade, and China has made important phased progress in R&D, but still needs to tackle a series of key scientific problems in key materials, interfaces, composite materials, electrodes and cells. Miao Wei, former Minister of Industry and Information Technology, emphasized in his speech that “initial results have been achieved in anti-involution, and the key to breaking the deadlock lies in differentiated innovation and systematic collaboration”.
In cutting-edge fields such as solid-state batteries, it is even more necessary to adhere to a development path with Chinese characteristics, unify thinking, integrate resources and form synergy. Chen Liquan, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, also noted that solid-state batteries still face severe challenges from “scientific breakthroughs” to “technological maturity” and then to “industrial deployment”, and the industry needs to promote basic research and applied research in coordination. Through technological leaps, China is seeking to fundamentally get rid of dependence on imported lithium resources—once solid-state batteries are scaled up, lithium consumption per unit of electricity will drop significantly, and tolerance for lithium resource grades will be higher, weakening resource-rich countries’ bargaining power on the demand side.
U.S. policy logic presents another tension. On March 12, 2026, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) voted 2-1 to formally overturn a previous U.S. Department of Commerce ruling, refusing to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese active anode materials. The Commerce Department had set extremely high rates: 93.50% for specific responding Chinese enterprises and 102.72% for all other Chinese exporters in anti-dumping duties; 66.82% to 66.86% for Chinese products in countervailing duties. When combined with basic trade tariffs, the total additional tariffs on relevant products would have exceeded 160%.
The core conclusion of the USITC shows that imports of Chinese active anode materials have not caused material injury to the establishment of the U.S. domestic industry. The superficial reason is “no harm to domestic industries”, but the real reason is that the U.S. new energy industry chain cannot do without China’s cost-effective and technologically advanced lithium battery materials—global negative electrode material capacity is highly concentrated in China, with leading enterprises enjoying significant cost and technological advantages. Forcibly imposing high tariffs would only push up procurement costs for U.S. domestic automakers and energy storage firms, ultimately backfiring on U.S. new energy transition progress.
Lin Boqiang, Dean of the China Institute for Energy Policy Studies at Xiamen University, commented: “This is certainly good news. Because the global new energy sector covers the entire industrial chain, Chinese enterprises lead the world in product competitiveness, technology and price, so no additional tariffs are definitely a boon. We export relatively few negative electrode materials directly, but in any case, this is positive for the entire battery industry chain.” An insider at a leading negative electrode material manufacturer further explained the tax calculation logic: tariffs are borne by U.S. importers and have no direct impact on domestic enterprises’ ex-factory prices, but the previously proposed high rates would have sharply raised transaction costs for U.S. importers.
It is ironic that political manipulation has been forced back by industrial reality—Washington can take a tough stance, but U.S. enterprises are unwilling to play along.
Trend Judgment: A New Pattern Under the Composite Pricing Model
Zimbabwe’s ban is a watershed, marking a shift in the global lithium resource pricing system from a simple “supply and demand-driven” model to a composite model of “geopolitics + green barriers”.
On one hand, the wave of resource nationalism is spreading globally. From Indonesia’s nickel ore export ban, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s suspension of cobalt exports in 2025 to address oversupply, to the completion of the “public-private partnership” for Chile’s SQM and the transfer of core lithium salt operations to Chile’s state-owned copper company—resource-rich countries are no longer willing to be “raw material warehouses”, instead pursuing local processing value addition and a larger share of value retention.
A recent analysis by Zijin Mining noted that “amid accelerating changes unseen in a century, frequent and severe geopolitical risks, escalating major power competition over critical minerals, global supply and industrial chains face multiple risks, and the mining development landscape is being restructured”. To this end, the company has prioritized overseas investments in the next three years to countries sharing land borders with China and other friendly countries with sound market and legal environments.
On the other hand, green barriers and trade protectionism are intertwined, and countries are increasingly pursuing “self-control” of supply chains. Strict restrictions on battery mineral sources under the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and local processing ratio targets under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act are reshaping global lithium trade flows. In this restructuring, those who master integrated production capacity and core technologies will gain pricing power.
In the short term, supply contraction will push lithium prices into a structural upward channel. In February 2026, lithium carbonate prices surged 68% in 30 days, marking the end of the “lithium industry winter” and the absorption of global oversupply. Leading enterprises with own mines will fully benefit from price dividends. Wedbush Securities analyzed that Albemarle is now benefiting from leaner operations through cost-cutting during the downturn, with its stock price rebounding sharply from 2025 lows to hit a 52-week high of $206.00. The losers are second- and third-tier battery manufacturers that failed to lock in long-term contracts during the 2025 price trough, facing dual pressure from rising raw material costs and canceled export subsidies, which is expected to trigger a wave of consolidation in the battery industry.
In the medium to long term, the industry will undergo a profound reshuffle. Small and medium-sized lithium salt plants without overseas own mines and relying solely on purchased lithium concentrate will face dual pressures of raw material shortages and high costs, accelerating their exit from the market; enterprises that have already made plans in advance for the “mine + beneficiation + local deep processing” full industrial chain will expand market share further by virtue of compliance advantages and cost barriers. The secondary market has reacted in advance—on February 26, Jinyuan Co., Ltd. with Ali Baqiancuo Salt Lake resources hit the daily limit, Salt Lake Co., Ltd., whose resources all come from Qarhan Salt Lake, surged nearly 8%, while Tianqi Lithium and Ganfeng Lithium, with resources at home and abroad, rose only about 3%. The top five lithium mining stocks by gain are all “self-controlled” enterprises, such as Jiangte Motor and Yongxing Materials in lithium mica extraction, and Tibet Mining, developer of Tibet’s Zabuye Salt Lake. This is no coincidence.
Meanwhile, the iteration of domestic salt lake lithium extraction technology and the maturity of lithium mica extraction processes are gradually reducing China’s lithium resource external dependence. Academician Ouyang Minggao emphasized at the Solid-State Battery Annual Conference that “major technological changes require gradual accumulation”, but to maintain China’s global leading position in lithium batteries, we must remain confident and tackle key problems.
Future competition will upgrade from resource reserves to a comprehensive contest of resource acquisition, technology R&D, policy adaptation and industrial chain integration. When lithium is no longer just a commodity but a strategic weapon, any weakness in a single link can become a fatal vulnerability. In this bloodless war, the ultimate winners will be long-termists who both deepen resources and pursue technological excellence.
